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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the First Circuit heard the case of Michelle Kosilek, a
transsexual inmate seeking Sex Reassignment Surgery [SRS]. 1 In
what appeared to be a monumental decision expanding the rights of
transsexual inmates, a three-judge panel upheld an injunction that
required the Massachusetts Department of Correction [DOC] to
provide Kosilek with SRS.2 However, shortly thereafter, the First

*Truman Young Prosecutorial Fellow, J.D. Candidate 2018, Arizona State
University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. I express my appreciation to
ASU Clinical Professor of Law, Kimberly Holst, who patiently provided
feedback on multiple drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Yucheng
Wang for her assistance in preparing the article for publication. Finally, I
extend deep gratitude to my family, particularly to my wife Anastasia, for her
constant love and support, and for making every aspect of my life better.
1. Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2014), withdrawn, Kosilek v.
Spencer, No. 12-2194, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at *3 (1st Cir. Feb. 12, 2014).
2. Kosilek, 740 F.3d at 773, withdrawn, Kosilek, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660,
at *3.
747
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Circuit voted to withdraw its opinion and rehear the case en banc.3
The en banc majority struck down the injunction, and Kosilek’s
request for SRS remained denied.4
In a forceful dissent from the en banc majority, Judge Ojetta
Thompson criticized the result, and shared her belief that the ruling
would one day rest on the wrong side of history. 5 She identified
“[p]rejudice and fear of the unfamiliar” as factors fighting against
Kosilek, stating: “I am confident that I would not need to pen this
dissent . . . were [Kosilek] not seeking a treatment that many see as
strange or immoral . . . this decision will not stand the test of time,
ultimately being shelved with the likes of Plessy v. Ferguson . . . and
Korematsu v. United States . . . .”6
At the heart of these opposing outcomes lies a fundamental
disagreement over the medical necessity of SRS—particularly
within the framework of the Eighth Amendment’s restriction of
cruel and unusual punishment.7 When claiming that a denial of
medical care amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, an inmate
must show two things: first, that the deprivation of care was
objectively serious, and second, that prison officials acted
deliberately indifferent towards a serious risk to the inmate’s health
or safety.8 A substantial risk of future harm, such as an increased
risk of suicide, may sustain an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim. 9

3. Kosilek, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at *3. The original opinion was
withdrawn after a “majority of the active judges” on the First Circuit voted to
rehear the case en banc. Id. However, the underlying reasons were not provided.
Id. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that “[a]n en banc hearing
or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc
consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s
decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”
FED. R. APP. P. 35. Here, the Court was not attempting to maintain uniformity
in its decisions. Rather, the en banc majority opinion begins by stating the “case
involves important issues that arise under the Eighth Amendment.” Kosilek v.
Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014). Additionally, in her dissent, Judge
Thompson explained that “the maintenance of uniformity [was] . . . not in play”
and expressed her belief that the rehearing occurred because the court believed
the case presented an issue of exceptional importance. Id. at 97 (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).
4. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96.
5. Id. at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
6. Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that racial
segregation in public facilities does not violate the equal protection clause);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of
Japanese Americans during WWII).
7. Compare Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 772-73 (1st Cir. 2014)
(affirming the district court’s ruling that SRS is medically necessary for
Kosilek), withdrawn, with Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96 (explaining that a treatment
plan that does not contain SRS may still satisfy the Eight Amendment).
8. E.g., Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 82–83.
9. Id. at 90 (“[F]uture risk of suicidality is not one that this court takes
lightly, and . . . clear risk of future harm may suffice to sustain an Eighth
Amendment claim.”) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)).
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Under this test, the original three-judge panel agreed with the
lower court that denial of SRS would amount to cruel and unusual
punishment; identifying the “intense mental anguish” Kosilek
experienced over her male genitalia as a serious medical condition
that antidepressants and psychotherapy could not fix.10 The en banc
majority disagreed; claiming that a denial of SRS is not harmful
enough to violate the Eighth Amendment when prison officials
follow a treatment plan designed by a qualified medical professional
that—although not including SRS—still treats the underlying
condition.11 Today, the decision of the en banc majority still stands.
However, in the short span of years that have passed since, a
noticeable shift towards expanded rights and protections for
transgender individuals has occurred,12 and Judge Thompson’s
prediction seems increasingly prescient.
Nevertheless, intense disagreement over the necessity of SRS
continues. Compare the views of Dr. Nick Gorton, a transgender
health expert and openly transgender physician,13 against those of
Dr. Paul McHugh, former psychiatrist-in-chief at Johns Hopkins
Hospital: Dr. Gorton believes that denial of SRS “exposes
[transsexual patients] to a longer duration of pain, suffering, and
decreased social functionality, [and] also unnecessarily places their
lives at risk.”14 He claims that transsexual patients who do not
receive sex reassignment therapies are twenty to thirty times more
likely to commit suicide than transsexual patients who do receive
such treatment.15
Dr. McHugh disagrees. He has stated: “policy makers and the
media are doing no favors either to the public or the transgendered
by treating their confusions as a right in need of defending rather
than as a mental disorder that deserves understanding, treatment
and prevention.”16 In fact, Dr. McHugh fears SRS can actually lead
to severe negative consequences, referencing a study conducted in
2011, which found “about 10 years after having [SRS], the
transgendered began to experience increasing mental difficulties . .

10. Kosilek, 740 F.3d at 766, withdrawn.
11. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91–92.
12. See infra Part IV (discussing relevant recent events).
13. Regents of the University of California, Medical Advisory Board: R. Nick
Gorton, MD, TRANSHEALTH.UCSF.EDU (2017), http://transhealth.ucsf.edu/trans?
page=ab-gorton.
14. The Sylvia Rivera Law Project, “It’s War in Here”: A Report on the
Treatment of Transgender and Intersex People in New York State Men’s Prisons,
SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT 1, 28 (2007), http://srlp.org/files/warinhere.pdf.
15. Id.
16. Paul McHugh, Transgender Surgery Isn't the Solution: A Drastic
Physical Change Doesn't Address Underlying Psycho-Social Troubles, WALL ST.
J. (June 12, 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/paul-mchugh-transgender-surgery-isn
t-the-solution-1402615120 (last updated May 13, 2016).
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. [and] their suicide mortality rose almost 20-fold above the
comparable non-transgender population.”17
These opposing viewpoints demonstrate the uncertainty and
polarity of opinions that this issue presents for Departments of
Correction around the country, as well as any court where the
question is raised. This uncertainty is significant because the
outcome of these cases is heavily influenced by whether a court
believes SRS is an effective treatment for a legitimate medical
condition.18
This article argues that at present, there is not sufficient
certainty within the medical and scientific communities to
definitively state that SRS is medically necessary for transsexual
individuals, or that it effectively relieves the negative symptoms
often associated with gender dysphoria. Because the Supreme Court
has held that the Eighth Amendment does not require prison
officials to provide the most cutting-edge treatments available, but
only an adequate level of treatment, it is not a violation of the
Eighth Amendment to deny a transsexual inmate’s request for SRS.
Part I explores the medical and scientific communities’ current
understanding of gender dysphoria, the medical treatments
available, and where uncertainty still exists. Part II examines the
challenges and dangers that transsexual inmates face, as well as
the difficulties they present for prison officials. Part III reviews the
Eighth Amendment’s restriction of cruel and unusual punishment,
and how courts have interpreted this restriction in regard to
medical care for inmates. The Kosilek decisions are examined in
order to demonstrate how the cruel and unusual punishment test is
applied. Part IV highlights the significant events that have occurred
since Kosilek, including the Army’s approval of SRS for inmate
Chelsea Manning, and a recent United States District Court
decision approving SRS for an inmate in California. Part V is a
discussion and analysis of the central question involved in this
17. Id. Dr. McHugh has been accused by LGBT advocates of being biased
against the LGBT community. See Brynn Tannehill, Johns Hopkins Professor
Endangers the Lives of Transgender Youth, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Mar.
20, 2016, 10:00 AM), www.huffingtonpost.com/brynn-tannehill/johns-hopkinsprofessor-e_b_9510808.html (claiming Dr. McHugh’s opinions are “based on
distortions, omissions, half-truths, outdated research, and motivated entirely
by religious based bias.”). However, the 2011 study Dr. McHugh cites does not
receive such criticism. In fact, the study concludes with a call for increased
follow-up and improved care for transgender individuals—not less. Cecilia
Dhejne et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex
Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden, 6 PLOS ONE e16885-1, e168857 (2011).
18. See Cynthia S. Osborne & Anne A. Lawrence, Male Prison Inmates with
Gender Dysphoria: When Is Sex Reassignment Surgery Appropriate?, 45
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1649, 1651 (2016) (“The medical necessity of SRS is
a fundamental issue, because U.S. courts have consistently ruled that failure to
provide inmates with necessary medical treatment . . . [violates] the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.”).
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issue: do transsexual inmates who medically qualify for the
procedure have a constitutional right to receive SRS? Part VI
concludes that at present, no such right exists.

PART I: UNDERSTANDING GENDER DYSPHORIA
The medical necessity of SRS is a fundamental consideration
when determining whether transsexual inmates have a
constitutional right to receive the procedure.19 No such decision can
competently be made without an updated and thorough
understanding of gender dysphoria.20 In 2013, the American
Psychiatric Association [APA] released the fifth edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM-V],
which helps to define and diagnose mental disorders. 21 Among the
changes made in the updated fifth edition was the replacement of
the diagnostic term “gender identity disorder” with “gender
dysphoria.”22 The APA felt it important to note, “gender
nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder,” and intended this
change in title as well as changes to the diagnostic criteria 23 to help
19. Id.
20. Lila Leonard, Gender Reassignment Surgery in Prisons: How the Eighth
Amendment Guarantees Medical Treatments Not Covered by Private Insurance
or Medicare for Law-Abiding Citizens, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 626, 629
(2014).
21. Wynne Parry, Gender Dysphoria: DSM-5 Reflects Shift in Perspective on
Gender Identity, HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2013), https://www.huffingtonp
ost.com/2013/06/04/gender-dysphoria-dsm-5_n_3385287.html;
Gender
Dysphoria, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/
dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-sheets (last visited Mar. 2, 2017)
[hereinafter APA].
22. APA, supra note 21.
23. The DSM-V diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria in adults and
adolescents include:
A.
A
marked
incongruence
between
one’s
experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender, of at
least 6 months’ duration, as manifested by at least two of the
following:
1.
A
marked
incongruence
between
one’s
experienced/expressed gender and primary and/or secondary
sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, the anticipated
secondary sex characteristics).
2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or
secondary sex characteristics because of a marked
incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender (or in
young adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of the
anticipated secondary sex characteristics).
3. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex
characteristics of the other gender.
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some
alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or
some alternative gender different from one’s assigned
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remove the stigma that all individuals who identify as transgender
are mentally ill.24
The DSM-V defines “gender dysphoria” as “the distress that
may accompany the incongruence between one's experienced or
expressed gender and one's assigned gender.” 25 Transsexualism is
the most extreme form of gender dysphoria.26 This term “denotes an
individual who seeks, or has undergone, a social transition from
male to female or female to male, which in many, but not all cases
also involves a somatic transition by cross-sex hormone treatment
and genital surgery.”27 Therefore, any inmate seeking SRS would be
considered transsexual.
Although identifying the prevalence of transsexualism proves
to be a difficult task,28 one systematic review of numerous studies
estimates the number of transsexual women to be about one in
every 14,705 individuals.29 The prevalence among men is lower:
about one in every 38,461 individuals.30 Recent studies show
statistically significant higher rates of transsexualism than older
studies.31 This is likely due to various factors, such as the condition
becoming less stigmatized and an increasing awareness and
availability of treatment options.32 In light of these trends, it seems
reasonable to believe that the estimates made by this systematic
review, although calculated using the best available data, may
significantly underestimate the true prevalence of the condition.
Individuals experiencing gender dysphoria often battle
significant mental and emotional challenges.33 The DSM-V explains
that gender dysphoria “is associated with high levels of
stigmatization, discrimination, and victimization, leading to
negative self-concept.”34 Sadly, this is common in the daily lives of

gender).
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings
and reactions of the other gender (or some alternative gender
different from one’s assigned gender).
APA, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 452–53
(5th ed., 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
24. APA, supra note 21.
25. DSM-V, supra note 23, at 451.
26. Osborne & Lawrence, supra note 18, at 1649.
27. DSM-V, supra note 23, at 451.
28. Factors that cause this difficulty include: the evolving classification
system; inconsistent use of terminology between studies; and the complexity of
general prevalence studies. J. Arcelus, et al., Systematic review and metaanalysis of prevalence studies in transsexualism, 30 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 807, 80708 (2015).
29. Id. at 811.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 812.
33. DSM-V, supra note 23, at 454–58.
34. Id. at 458.
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many transgendered individuals. 35 The collective impact of such
treatment leads to elevated risk for drug and alcohol abuse, and
suicide attempts.36 Indeed, a survey of 6,450 transgender
individuals in the United States, performed by the National Center
for Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force [hereinafter Transgender Discrimination Survey] revealed
that 41% of respondents had attempted suicide. 37
Additional effects of gender dysphoria may include “increased
rates of mental disorder comorbidity, school dropout, and economic
marginalization, including unemployment, with attendant social
and mental health risks.”38 These problems are compounded by
structural barriers that impede access to mental and physical
healthcare services, such as institutional discomfort or inexperience
in working with transgender individuals.39

A. Treatment Options
While there are numerous treatments designed to reduce or
eliminate gender dysphoria, the World Professional Association for
Transgender Health’s [WPATH] Standards of Care manual is
considered by some to be “the most comprehensive and evidencebased set of recommendations for treating the condition.” 40 WPATH
describes one of the manual’s main functions as “[promoting] the
highest standards of health care for individuals through the
articulation of Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual,
Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People.” 41 The
organization further claims that the Standards of Care “are based
on the best available science and expert professional consensus.” 42
However, it should be noted that while some courts
have regarded the Standards of Care as authoritative,43 others have
emphasized that they are merely flexible “guidelines.” 44
35. Jaime M. Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National
Transgender Discrimination Survey, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE
84 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/n
tds_full.pdf.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 82.
38. DSM-V, supra note 23, at 458.
39. Id.
40. Transgender Medicine Model NCD Working Group, Summary of Clinical
Evidence for Gender Reassignment Surgeries, CMS.GOV 1, 2, www.cms.gov/Medi
care/Coverage/DeterminationProcess/Downloads/Kalra_comment_01022016_b
.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
41. THE WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH,
STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND
GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 1 (7th version, 2011) [hereinafter WPATH].
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 763 (1st Cir. 2014);
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
44. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 87 (1st Cir. 2014); see also Osborne &
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Medical and psychological treatment options recommended by
WPATH fall into four main types:
1. Changing gender expression and role (“which may
involve living part time or full time in another gender
role, consistent with one’s gender identity”);
2. Hormone therapy (“to feminize or masculinize the
body”);
3. SRS;
4. Psychotherapy (“for purposes such as exploring gender
identity, role, and expression; [and] addressing the
negative impact of gender dysphoria”). 45
In addition to (and in some cases as alternatives to) medical
and psychological treatments, WPATH recommends additional
changes in social support and gender expression that may help
alleviate gender dysphoria, including:
•
•
•
•
•

Peer support resources, groups, or community
organizations that provide avenues for social support
and advocacy;
Voice and communication therapy to help individuals
develop verbal and non-verbal communication skills
that facilitate comfort with their gender identity;
Hair removal through electrolysis, laser treatment, or
waxing;
Breast binding or padding, genital tucking or penile
prostheses, padding of hips or buttocks;
Changes in name and gender marker on identity
documents.46

While WPATH views SRS as “often the last . . . step in the
treatment process for severe gender dysphoria,” it does claim that
for some transsexuals the procedure is medically necessary. 47
While some individuals desire full gender reassignment,
including hormonal treatments and SRS, some do not wish to
receive SRS, and others do not desire any treatment at all. 48 For
some, whether to undergo SRS is not viewed as a choice. 49 Rather,
they consider SRS “the only possible solution to life-long suffering .
Lawrence, supra note 18, at 1650-51 (discussing the shortcomings and critiques
of the Standards of Care).
45. WPATH, supra note 41, at 9-10.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id. at 54-55.
48. Gennaro Selvaggi et al., The 2011 WPATH Standards of Care and Penile
Reconstruction in Female-to-Male Transsexual Individuals, 2012 ADVANCES IN
UROLOGY 1, 1-2 (2012).
49. David Valentine, Sue E. Generous: Toward a Theory of NonTransexuality, 38 FEMINIST STUD. 185, 192 (2012).
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. . it is no more of a choice than any other medical procedure that
might save a life.”50 Others hold a different view. Author and gender
theorist Kate Bornstein, who underwent SRS, stated: “I accept the
label transsexual as meaning only that I was dissatisfied with my
given gender, and I acted to change it. I am transsexual by choice,
not by pathology.”51
The results of the Transgender Discrimination Survey are
consistent with this dichotomy. The survey revealed that only 33%
of respondents had undergone SRS.52 An additional 28% had
received hormonal treatments.53 These relatively low numbers may
be partially explained by individuals being unable to afford
treatment; over 25% of the survey’s respondents reported making
less than $25,000 per year, while genital transition alone may cost
over $20,000, and more comprehensive transitions can cost over
$100,000.54 However, the survey revealed that many transgender
individuals do not desire SRS at all. 55 While 53% of biologically born
female respondents indicated that they would like to eventually
undergo metoidioplasty (creation of testes), only 27% indicated that
they would like to undergo phalloplasty (creation of penis). 56 Sixtyfour percent of biologically born male respondents indicated that
they would like to undergo vaginoplasty (creation of vagina) while
53% stated they would like to receive breast augmentation
surgery.57
Most clinicians agree that SRS is not a “cure” for gender
dysphoria.58 Rather, it is considered a “strategy to diminish the
serious suffering of a transsexual Person.”59 However, empirical
data to support this claim is lacking. Although the current form of
the procedure has been practiced for over fifty years, data regarding
suicide rates and psychological disorders post-SRS is limited.60
Additionally, many of the studies that have been published provide
inconsistent results that at times contradict each other. 61 One
research team identified four reasons why reliable information
50. Id.
51. KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST
OF US 118 (1994).
52. Grant et al., supra note 35, at 52.
53. Id.
54. THE PHILADELPHIA CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER SURGERY, www.thetran
sgendercenter.com/index.php/price-list.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2017); Chris
Taylor, Transgender Surgery Can Cost More Than $100,000, TIME (Oct. 29,
2015), http://time.com/money/4092680/transgender-surgery-costs/.
55. Grant et al., supra note 35, at 52.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Luk Gijs & Anne Brewaeys, Surgical Treatment of Gender Dysphoria in
Adults and Adolescents: Recent Developments, Effectiveness, and Challenges, 18
ANN. REV. SEX RES. 178, 184 (2007).
59. Id.
60. Dhejne et al., supra note 17, at e16885-1 to e16885-2.
61. Id.

756

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:747

regarding the efficacy of SRS is so difficult to obtain. 62 First,
performing double blind, randomized controlled studies of SRS is
not possible because the nature of SRS prevents researchers from
providing one group of subjects with a mere placebo procedure. 63
Second, because transsexualism is rare, follow-up studies are
constrained by the limited number of subjects. 64 Third, many
individuals who have undergone SRS decline to participate in such
studies and often relocate following the procedure.65 This results in
“high drop-out rates and consequent selection bias.”66 Fourth, many
studies have been hindered by limited follow-up periods.67
Collectively, “these limitations preclude solid and generalizable
conclusions.”68
Additionally, the information that is available seems to merely
produce uncertainty over whether SRS is effective in treating the
mental and emotional side effects of gender dysphoria. The
Transgender Discrimination Survey revealed that perplexingly,
those who had undergone SRS had higher rates of attempted suicide
than those who had not received the procedure (43% and 39%
respectively).69 However, the survey did not ask respondents to
clarify at what age they had attempted suicide, so it is “difficult to
draw conclusions about the risk of suicide over their life spans.” 70
Perhaps most who had received SRS had attempted suicide prior to
surgery rather than after surgery.
Yet, proponents of SRS cite studies showing extremely
favorable outcomes and positive results following the procedure. 71
In its Standards of Care manual, WPATH states that “[f]ollow-up
studies have shown an undeniable beneficial effect of sex
reassignment surgery on postoperative outcomes.” 72 The most
substantial, modern study WPATH cites in support of this claim
analyzed eighteen treatment evaluation studies, all of which were
conducted after 1990.73 This study concluded that 96% of
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; Sutcliffe et al., Evaluation of Surgical Procedures for Sex
Reassignment: A Systematic Review, 62 J. PLASTIC, RECONSTRUCTIVE &
AESTHETIC SURGERY 294, 303 (2009).
65. Dhejne et al., supra note 17, at e16885-1 to e16885-2.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Grant et al., supra note 35, at 82.
70. Id.
71. E.g., WPATH, supra note 41, at 55.
72. Id.
73. Gijs & Brewaeys, supra note 58, at 185-87. While WPATH does cite to a
collective review that examined more studies than Gijs & Brewaeys, this review
was published in 1998, and examined follow-up studies conducted between 1961
and 1991, with a much less critical approach than that utilized by Gijs &
Brewaeys to identify and disregard less reliable studies. WPATH, supra note
42, at 55. Compare Pfäfflin, F., & Junge, A., Sex reassignment. Thirty Years of
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transsexuals who received SRS reported feeling satisfied with the
outcome of the procedure at least one year removed from surgery.74
Such overwhelming satisfaction surely seems to support the
statement that the procedure has an “undeniable beneficial
effect.”75 However, the cited study includes the following caution:
Methodologically, however, this conclusion should be carefully
qualified. Not one of the reviewed outcome studies was a controlled
one. . . . Furthermore, a number of investigators used only a posttest
to measure the effects of SRS. In many studies, sound psychometric
instruments were not used. Especially disturbing is that many
researchers did not directly measure gender dysphoria as the main
outcome variable but instead used derivative measures, for example,
satisfaction with surgery, sexual and interpersonal relationships,
occupational and global functioning, or quality of life in general. . . .
In addition to the design problems of the studies, patient numbers are
seriously skewed. A large number of patients who received surgery
were lost at follow-up.76

This methodological uncertainty is problematic because
changing an individual’s external genitalia is a unique intervention
“not only in psychiatry but in all of medicine.”77 While many studies
purport to show that SRS effectively relieves gender dysphoria,
others report regrets, psychiatric morbidity, and suicide attempts
following the procedure.78
Although some courts have considered the WPATH Standards
of Care to be authoritative,79 the above example highlights why
courts should be cautious before doing so. While WPATH portrays
its standards as scientific, the organization also advocates for the
transgender community, and encourages clinicians to do the same. 80
Advocacy on behalf of vulnerable populations is by no means an
unworthy cause. However, Dr. Stephen B. Levine, who helped write
the fifth version of the Standards of Care manual, 81 has expressed

International Follow-Up Studies After Sex Reassignment Surgery: A
Comprehensive Review, 1961-1991. INT. J. TRANSGENDERISM (1998), with Gijs
& Brewaeys, supra note 58, at 178.
74. Gijs & Brewaeys, supra note 58, at 199.
75. WPATH, supra note 42, at 55.
76. Gijs & Brewaeys, supra note 58, at 199.
77. Dhejne et al., supra note 17, at e16885-1 to e16885-2.
78. Id.
79. See e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 763–64 (1st Cir. 2014)
(claiming the Standards of Care are widely relied upon, trusted, and “generally
accepted” in the courts), withdrawn; Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164,
1192 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting expert medical testimony for being inconsistent
with the Standards of care).
80. See Stephen B. Levine, Reflections on the Legal Battles Over Prisoners
with Gender Dysphoria, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 236, 240 (2016).
81. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 77 (1st Cir. 2014). Dr. Levine is
currently a Professor of Psychiatry at Case Western Reserve University School
of Medicine, and Co-director of the Beachwood, Ohio Gender Identity Clinic.
Levine, supra note 80, at 236.
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concern over WPATH’s combination of science and social
advocacy.82 In his view, this combination is problematic because
science is meant to “provide[] a dispassionate view of . . . the facts,”
while advocacy can cause an organization to become “disinterested
in emphasizing the limitations of its position,” and to “muster[] the
facts that support [its] goal.” 83 In Dr. Levine’s experience,
skepticism and alternative viewpoints are not well received within
the WPATH organization, and he believes certain elements of
WPATH’s Standards of Care represent political, rather than
scientific positions.84
Regardless of the confidence one places in the current body of
research supporting SRS, it is undeniable that the transsexual
population faces difficult challenges. In addition to efforts to combat
the discrimination they face, research analyzing the effectiveness of
SRS must improve, and other medical treatments must continue to
develop. Although the current body of research supporting SRS
suffers from considerable methodological limitations, 85 research
methods are improving, and “controlled outcome studies . . .
evaluating the effectiveness of SRS are eagerly awaited.”86

PART II: TRANSGENDER INMATES:
CHALLENGES FACED AND CHALLENGES CREATED
The precise number of transgender inmates in the United
States prison system is unknown.87 However, based upon court
documents and reports from Departments of Correction around the
country, there are an estimated 500 to 750 transgender inmates in
custody in state facilities and another 50 to 100 in federal
facilities.88 Since many inmates never receive an official diagnosis,
this likely underestimates the actual number of inmates
experiencing gender dysphoria.89
Much of the abuse and discrimination that transgender
individuals experience outside of prison is also prevalent within the
prison system.90 Traditionally, most of this discrimination and
abuse has involved issues of placement, safety, clothing and

82. Levine, supra note 80, at 240.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. E.g., Mohammad Hassan Murad et al., Hormonal Therapy and Sex
Reassignment: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Quality of Life and
Psychosocial Outcomes, 72 CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY 214, 214-231. (2010).
86. Gijs & Brewaeys, supra note 58, at 215.
87. George R. Brown & Everett McDuffie, Health Care Policies Addressing
Transgender Inmates in Prison Systems in the United States, 15 J.
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 280, 281 (2009).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The Sylvia Rivera Law Project, supra note 14, at 17.
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appearance, and access to medical care. 91 During a series of
interviews, transgender inmates in the New York prison system
recounted some of the horrors they faced while incarcerated:
I have been beaten and raped because [I’m both] a transgender with
female breasts and feminine. I have been burned out of a cell block
[and] dorm because I wouldn’t give an inmate sex. I have been
slapped, punched, and even threatened because [I’m] a transgender
that told another inmate ‘No’ when they told me they wanted sex from
me . . . . I have been harassed verbally and have had others grab my
female breasts and ass because they knew I was transgender and
figured they can get away with such actions—which they do most of
the time due to the fact no one cares what happens to us transgenders
inside. . . . 92
I have trouble showering safely because that’s when others come in
the bathroom and always try to see me naked, ask me for sex, or try
to take sex from me even though I’m unwilling to do anything sexual
with them.93
[I]t’s war in here. The administration is against us . . . The
correctional officers are the ones who are the most violent. They’re
the ones to be scared of. . . . I’ve made complaint after complaint, but
no response. No success.94

Fortunately, in 2003 Congress passed the Prison Rape
Elimination Act [PREA].95 In addition to establishing a “zero
tolerance” standard for prison rape,96 the Act called for the
development of “national standards for the detection, prevention,
reduction, and punishment of prison rape.”97 In 2012, these
standards were finally released, and were made binding on the
Federal Bureau of Prisons.98 While not binding on state agencies,
PREA includes significant financial incentives to comply with its
standards.99 Each state detention facility must be audited at least
once every three years, and if the state is not in full compliance with
PREA standards, its federal prison grants may be reduced by five
percent.100 If, however, the state’s governor guarantees that the five
percent will be used to come into compliance with PREA, the
funding is preserved.101

91. Id.
92. Id. at 25.
93. Id. at 30.
94. Id. at 19.
95. Gabriel Arkles, Prison Rape Elimination Act Litigation and the
Perpetuation of Sexual Harm, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 802 (2014).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 15602(1) (2012).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 15602(3) (2012).
98. Arkles, supra note 95, at 806.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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A. Placement and Protection
Some PREA standards are specifically directed at the
placement and protection of transgender inmates. 102 For example,
prison facilities are required to allow transgender and intersex
inmates the opportunity to shower separately from other
inmates.103 Additionally, placement concerns were addressed by
requiring agencies to consider the housing of transgender inmates
on a case-by-case basis to ensure that they are placed in a safe
environment.104 When making these housing decisions, prison
officials are required to give serious consideration to a transgender
inmate’s own views regarding his or her safety, and to reassess each
transgender inmate’s placement and programming at least twice
each year.105
Traditionally, an inmate’s external genital anatomy was used
to determine their sex classification and placement into either a
men’s or women’s facility.106 As one prison official summarized:
“[a]n inmate with a penis is considered male; one with a vagina is
considered female. It doesn't matter whether nature or a surgeon
provided the part.”107 In 2016, the Department of Justice specifically
rejected this traditional approach by clarifying standard 115.42(e),
explaining that “[a]ny written policy or actual practice that assigns
transgender or intersex inmates to gender-specific facilities,
housing units, or programs based solely on their external genital
anatomy violates [PREA].”108 However, the DOJ recognizes that due
to security concerns, deciding where to house a transgender inmate
is complicated.109

B. Security Concerns
The Supreme Court has declared that the “central objective of
prison administration [is] safeguarding institutional security.”110

102. 28 C.F.R. 115.42 (2012).
103. 28 C.F.R. 115.42(f) (2012).
104. 28 C.F.R. 115.42(c)-(e) (2012).
105. Id.
106. Christine Peek, Breaking Out of the Prison Hierarchy: Transgender
Prisoners, Rape, and the Eighth Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1211,
1219 (2004).
107. Sydney Scott, "One Is Not Born, But Becomes a Woman": A Fourteenth
Amendment Argument in Support of Housing Male-to-Female Transgender
Inmates in Female Facilities, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1259, 1272 (2013) (quoting
Ken Hollen, Assoc. Superintendent, Shelton Corr. Ctr., Wash.).
108. DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance, Does a Policy that Houses
Transgender or Intersex Inmates Based Exclusively on External Genital
Anatomy Violate Standard 115.42(c) & (e)?, NATIONAL PREA RESOURCE
CENTER (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/node/3927.
109. Id.
110. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
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The Court explained that “maintaining institutional security and
preserving internal order and discipline . . . may require limitation
or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of . . . convicted
prisoners.”111 As such, security considerations become particularly
relevant when an inmate claims his or her constitutional rights
have been violated, because even if DOC policies and procedures
infringe on a constitutional guarantee, security considerations may
justify the intrusion.112
In cases involving transgender inmates, prison officials must
balance security concerns against an inmate’s specific needs and
requests. For example, when a transgender inmate requests (or has
previously undergone) hormone therapy or SRS, prison officials
must make a difficult decision regarding where to house the inmate,
without exposing the transgender inmate or any other inmate to
unacceptable levels of risk or psychological trauma. 113
Similar considerations were involved in Battista v. Clarke. 114
Sandy Battista, a biologically born male had been convicted of rape
and was housed at the Massachusetts Treatment Center for
Sexually Dangerous Persons.115 Battista sought an injunction
requiring the Massachusetts DOC to provide her with hormone
therapy and female clothing.116 The DOC argued that “sexual
contacts or assaults by other detainees would be made more likely
by female clothing and accessories and the enhancement of breasts
due to hormone therapy.”117 The First Circuit acknowledged these
security concerns, and recognized that they were important factors
to consider.118 The court specifically rejected basing such decisions
upon medical judgment alone, stating, “[a]ny professional judgment
that decides an issue involving conditions of confinement must
embrace security and administration, and not merely medical
judgments.”119
Ultimately, the court affirmed the decision of the district court
to grant Battista’s injunction.120 However, the court implied that its
decision might have been different if the DOC had more adequately
handled the case by placing greater emphasis on security
concerns.121 Specifically, the court stated that “this would be a much
harder case if [the DOC] had proffered a persuasive and untainted
professional judgment that—while hormone therapy would help

111. Id. at 546–47.
112. Id.
113. See generally Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 450.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 451.
118. Id. at 454-55.
119. Id. at 455 (quoting Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1993)).
120. Battista, 645 F.3d at 455.
121. Id. at 454-55.
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Battista—the dangers, security costs and other impediments made
it infeasible.”122
Ultimately, determining where to house transsexual inmates
presents difficult problems for prison officials, and there are no easy
answers.123 However, the expectation that prison officials will follow
PREA standards by making housing decisions on a case-by-case
basis while also giving serious considering to a transgender
inmate’s own views with respect his or her own safety has been
made clear.124

C. Clothing and Appearance
Concerns over clothing and appearance are not addressed by
PREA. Although inmates have a constitutional right to “adequate
clothing,”125 very few courts have held that transgender prisoners
have a constitutional right to wear clothing items that correspond
with their stated gender identity. 126 Often, transgender women held
in male prison facilities are denied access to bras and other feminine
undergarments, and sometimes not allowed to grow their hair past
a certain length.127 Likewise, transgender men held in women’s
facilities are often expected to keep their face clean-shaven.128 These
experiences
can
be
psychologically
harmful
for
transgender inmates, and can lead to elevated levels of gender
dysphoria.129
However, as awareness and understanding of gender
dysphoria continues to increase, there appears to be a growing trend
122. Id. at 454.
123. See infra Part V (discussing potential security concerns, and possible
solutions).
124. DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance, supra note 108.
125. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
126. See Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 908–11 (E.D. Wis. 2010)
(finding that denial of inmate’s requests for makeup, women’s undergarments,
and facial hair remover may give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation);
Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 246 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that delay
in providing female clothing for inmate’s GID treatment constituted deliberate
indifference). However, most courts have taken a different stance. See, e.g.,
Lopez v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 10321, 2009 WL 229956, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 30, 2009) (refusal of inmates request to wear women’s clothing did not
violate 14th Amendment); Nelson v. Anderson, No. 7:07cv00149, 2007 WL
989980, at *2 (W.D. Va. March 30, 2007) (prison officials violated transgender
inmate’s generalized due process rights by forbidding him from drawing his
eyebrows on); Powell v. Cusimano, 326 F.Supp. 2d 322, 343 (D. Conn. 2004)
(rejecting inmate’s equal protection claims concerning prison’s prohibition
against hair extensions).
127. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR
LESBIAN RIGHTS, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: LAWS, COURT DECISIONS, AND
ADVOCACY TIPS TO PROTECT TRANSGENDER PRISONERS 7 (2014), www.aclu.org
/files/assets/121414-aclu-prea-kyrs-1_copy.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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towards allowing transgender inmates to dress and groom
themselves consistent with their gender identity.130 For example,
the King County, Washington jail allows transgender women to
order and wear bras and other feminine clothing items made
available for female inmates at the commissary. 131 Similarly, in
2012 the Denver, Colorado Sherriff Department implemented
policies that allow transgender inmates to wear clothing, groom,
and use names and pronouns that are consistent with their gender
identity.132
Overall, PREA signifies a substantial shift towards expanded
rights and protections for transgender inmates. However, these
standards are useless if prison officials fail to implement them. 133
Admittedly, trusting prison officials to properly implement PREA
may be difficult in light of the Transgender Discrimination Survey,
which revealed that it is not uncommon for prison officials to be a
source of abuse and harassment for transgender inmates. 134
However, the DOJ has released training materials acknowledging
this concern,135 and PREA includes severe disciplinary sanctions for
prison staff that violate the Act.136 Progress still needs to be made,
and transgender inmates remain a highly vulnerable population,
but PREA is an important step in the right direction, and slowly but
surely, the voices of transgender inmates are being heard.

PART III: THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
AND INMATE MEDICAL CARE
The medical necessity of SRS is fundamental to the decision of
whether to grant a transsexual inmate’s request for the
procedure.137 This is due to the manner in which the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s restriction of cruel and
unusual punishment.138 The Amendment states: “[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. JODY MARKSAMER & HARPER JEAN TOBIN, STANDING WITH LGBT
PRISONERS: AN ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO ENDING ABUSE AND COMBATING
IMPRISONMENT 41, 51 (2013), www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/res
ources/JailPrisons_Resource_FINAL.pdf.
133. For a discussion of the failure of certain courts and detention centers to
properly implement PREA to protect vulnerable inmates, see Arkles, supra note
95, at 801.
134. Grant et al., supra note 35, at 158.
135. DOJ, Policy Review and Development Guide: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender, and Intersex Persons in Custodial Settings, NATIONAL PREA
RESOURCE CENTER (2013), www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/libra
ry/lgbtipolicyguideaugust2013.pdf.
136. 28 C.F.R. 115.76 (2012).
137. See Osborne & Lawrence, supra note 18, at 1651.
138. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
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unusual punishments inflicted.”139 To determine whether the level
of care provided or withheld from an inmate constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, the Supreme Court has developed a twopronged test.140 The first prong is an objective standard, requiring
that the alleged deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” 141 The second
prong is a subjective standard, which to be satisfied, requires that
prison officials act deliberately indifferent towards a serious risk to
an inmate’s health or safety.142 Both prongs must be satisfied to
prevail on an inadequate medical care claim. 143

A. The Objective Prong
When medical care is at issue, the first prong requires “proof of
a serious medical need.”144 A medical condition or need is objectively
serious “if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's
attention.”145 The objective standard does not create a requirement
that inmates receive perfectly tailored medical treatment, or the
most cutting-edge treatments available.146 The Supreme Court has
explained that “society does not expect that prisoners will have
unqualified access to health care.”147 In reference to confinement
conditions generally, only “deprivations denying the minimal
139. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.
140. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 834-40; see also James McGrath, Raising the "Civilized
Minimum" of Pain Amelioration for Prisoners to Avoid Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 54 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 649, 665 (2002).
143. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014).
144. Id.
145. Gaudreault v. Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990); see also e.g.,
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
347 (3d Cir. 1987) (defining serious condition as a condition that “has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that
a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”); Hunt
v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a medical need
is sufficiently serious “if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”); Johnson v. Busby, 953
F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1991) (defining serious medical need as “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that
even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”).
But see Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (where the court
essentially rephrases the Estelle standard- defining “serious condition” as a
condition which will result in significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain” if left untreated).
146. E.g., Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 82; United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39,
42 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]hough it is plain that an inmate deserves adequate
medical care, he cannot insist that his institutional host provide him with the
most sophisticated care that money can buy.”).
147. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
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civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form
the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”148 Lower courts have
phrased this standard in different ways. 149 While some have said
that the alleged deprivation must be “so inadequate as to shock the
conscience,”150 others have said that prisoners are entitled only to
“minimum care.”151 Regardless of variations in style, the substance
is similar: only “outrageous” deprivations are likely to be
remedied.152
This is not to say that prison officials satisfy all Eighth
Amendment requirements by simply providing any form of
treatment. The following hypothetical provided by the Fourth
Circuit illustrates this point. Imagine a situation in which an
inmate suffers a serious injury that “by all objective measures,
requires evaluation for surgery.”153 However, what if prison officials
only provided painkillers for the inmate?154 Would they then “be free
to deny him consideration for surgery, immunized from
constitutional suit by the fact that they were giving him a
painkiller?”155 The court felt that such minimal treatment would be
insufficient, and concluded, “although . . . a prisoner does not enjoy
a constitutional right to the treatment of his or her choice, the
treatment a prison facility does provide must nevertheless be
adequate to address the prisoner's serious medical need.”156
Ultimately, prison officials must provide treatments that are
compatible with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”157

B. The Subjective Prong
To satisfy the second prong, an inmate must show that prison
officials acted deliberately indifferent towards a serious risk to the
inmate’s health or safety.158 The “serious risk” requirement may be

148. Id.
149. See generally Carl T. Drechsler, Annotation, Relief Under Federal Civil
Rights Acts to State Prisoners Complaining of Denial of Medical Care, 28 A.L.R.
Fed. 279 (2017) (discussing the variations of this standard in a slightly different
context).
150. E.g., Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83 (quoting Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231,
235 (1st Cir. 1991)).
151. Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997).
152. See generally Drechsler, supra note 149 (discussing the variations of
this standard in a slightly different context).
153. De'Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 (4th Cir. 2013).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (internal citations
omitted).
158. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-40 (1994); see also McGrath,
supra note 142, at 665.
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satisfied by a clear risk that future harm may occur. 159 Seminal
cases involved in the development of this test include Estelle v.
Gamble160 and Farmer v. Brennan.161 Estelle established the
“deliberate indifference” standard, which the Supreme Court
further clarified in Farmer.162
Estelle involved an inmate housed in a Texas correctional
facility who sustained a back injury while performing prison
work.163 He claimed prison officials failed to provide adequate
medical treatment following his injury, thereby violating the Eighth
Amendment.164 In recounting the history of the Amendment’s
restriction of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court stated that
punishments involving “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain” are repugnant to the Eighth Amendment, 165 and “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”166
However, the Court ultimately held that the prison officials’
conduct did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 167 Prison
doctors had diagnosed Estelle with a lower back strain, and
proscribed pain relievers, muscle relaxants and bed rest. 168
Although there were additional diagnostic techniques and
treatments that could have been pursued, the Court viewed this as
“a classic example of a matter for medical judgment,” and added “[a]
medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not
represent cruel and unusual punishment.”169
Following Estelle, lower courts struggled to determine exactly
what constituted “deliberate indifference” and developed
inconsistent tests for the standard. 170 In Farmer, the Supreme
Court attempted to alleviate this confusion by adopting a subjective
awareness standard.171 For deliberate indifference to be
established, an inmate must show that prison officials have a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.”172 In other words, the

159. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (“[P]etitioners have,
with deliberate indifference . . . pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage
to his future health.”).
160. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97.
161. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825; McGrath, supra note 142, at 663-66.
162. Id.
163. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
164. Id. at 101.
165. Id. at 102-03 (internal citations omitted).
166. Id. at 104 (internal citations omitted).
167. Id. at 107-08.
168. Id. at 107.
169. Id.
170. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see also McGrath, supra
note 142, at 664.
171. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; see also McGrath, supra note 142, at 664.
172. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
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subjective standard requires that the prison officials “knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.”173
One additional consideration under the subjective prong is the
security concerns of prison officials.174 As noted above, the Supreme
Court has held that even if institutional restrictions infringe upon
constitutional rights, the infringement must be evaluated in light of
“the central objective of prison administration, [which is]
safeguarding institutional security.”175 Ultimately, as long as prison
officials “make judgments balancing security and health concerns
that are within the realm of reason and made in good faith, their
decisions do not amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”176

C. The Test Applied: Kosilek v. Spencer
Michelle Kosilek, an anatomically male prisoner who selfidentifies as female, was convicted of first-degree murder in 1992
for the strangulation of her wife, and was sentenced to life in prison
without parole.177 Since 1994, Kosilek has been held in a mediumsecurity male prison in Massachusetts. 178 While awaiting trial for
her wife’s murder, Kosilek made two suicide attempts, and on one
occasion attempted self-castration, but abandoned the endeavor
when it became painful.179 Kosilek initially received only
“supportive therapy” and filed her first lawsuit seeking expanded
treatment for gender dysphoria in 1992. 180 In 2002, a federal district
court issued a decision making it clear that the Massachusetts DOC
needed to provide additional treatment for Kosilek’s condition. 181
Accordingly, her treatment was expanded in 2003 to include
additional ameliorative measures, such as hormonal treatment and
the provision of female clothing.182
Following this expansion of treatment, Kosilek continued to
seek SRS.183 After receiving input from numerous medical experts,
the DOC decided it would not provide her with the procedure. 184 In
2006, another trial commenced in federal district court, which
culminated in the granting of Kosilek’s injunction for SRS in

173. McGrath, supra note 142, at 665.
174. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 92 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
175. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546-47.
176. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 92 (quoting Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 454
(1st Cir. 2011).
177. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 68-69.
178. Id. at 69.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 69-70.
183. Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2014), withdrawn, Kosilek v.
Spencer, No. 12-2194, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at *3 (1st Cir. Feb. 12, 2014).
184. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70–74.
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2012.185 The DOC appealed, and in 2014, a three-judge First Circuit
panel [hereinafter Kosilek I] upheld the district court’s decision. 186
Shortly thereafter, the First Circuit withdrew its opinion, and
reheard the case en banc [hereinafter Kosilek II].187 A comparison
between these two First Circuit decisions—Kosilek II and the
withdrawn opinion that it supersedes—demonstrates the impact
that the WPATH Standards of Care have when a court considers
them to be authoritative rather than flexible guidelines.188
1. The Objective Prong
That gender dysphoria should be considered an objectively
serious medical condition was not disputed in Kosilek.189 Rather, the
parties disagreed over whether SRS was a medically necessary
component of Kosilek’s treatment—“such that any course of
treatment not including surgery [was] constitutionally
inadequate.”190 Kosilek argued that the only “constitutionally
sufficient treatment regimen” was full adherence to the Standards
of Care.191 She emphasized the fact that doctors from two separate
institutions—both of whom were hired by the Massachusetts
DOC— testified that SRS was “medically necessary” and that denial
of SRS “would almost certainly lead to a deterioration in Kosilek's
mental state and a high likelihood of self-harming behaviors.”192
Conversely, the DOC argued that full progression through the
Standards of Care treatment sequence “is not the only adequate
treatment option” and that Kosilek’s condition could be
appropriately managed with a treatment plan that did not include
SRS.193 This alternative treatment plan provided Kosilek with “such
alleviative measures as psychotherapy, hormones, electrolysis, and
the provision of female garb and accessories.”194 In support of this
alternative treatment plan, the DOC relied upon the advice of
accredited medical professionals and claimed that such treatment
“far exceeds a level of care that would be so inadequate as to shock
the conscience.”195 The DOC further noted that in practice, their
treatment plan had “greatly diminished Kosilek's mental distress
and allowed her a fair measure of contentment.”196
185. Id. 74-82.
186. Kosilek, 740 F.3d at 736, withdrawn.
187. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 63.
188. Compare Kosilek, 774 F.3d with Kosilek, 740 F.3d, withdrawn. For a
discussion of the WPATH Standards of Care, see infra Part I.
189. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
196. Id.
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A notable point of difference between Kosilek I and Kosilek II
is the contrasting views the courts held of testimony provided by Dr.
Chester Schmidt, a licensed psychiatrist and Associate Director of
the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine.197 Dr. Schmidt testified on
behalf of the DOC that he believed its treatment plan, which did not
include SRS, was adequate.198 Dr. Schmidt viewed the Standards of
Care “as protocols or guidelines” and did not agree with the claim
that “sex reassignment surgery is medically necessary in patients
with severe gender identity disorder.”199 The district court that
initially granted Kosilek’s injunction rejected Dr. Schmidt’s
views.200 It concluded he was “not a prudent professional” because
“he does not accept certain fundamental features of the Standards
of Care.”201
In Kosilek I, the court began its review of the objective prong
with a consideration of the lower court’s rejection of Dr. Schmidt. 202
It did not believe this determination constituted “clear error,” which
was the standard of review it employed.203 The court supported this
conclusion by noting, “Dr. Schmidt expressed a good deal of
disagreement with the Standards of Care.”204 Additionally, his
views regarding the medical necessity of SRS were “not only
unsupported by the Standards of Care but also contradicted by the
testimony of the other medical providers at trial.”205 By dismissing
Dr. Schmidt’s testimony as imprudent, the court was left with a
majority of testifying medical experts who offered support for the
Standards of Care and believed SRS was a medically necessary
procedure for Kosilek.206 Ultimately, the court believed that since
there were “three eminently qualified doctors [who] testify without
objection, in accord with widely accepted, published standards, that
Kosilek suffers from a life-threatening disorder that renders
surgery medically necessary” then it could not overrule the lower
court’s finding that an objectively serious deprivation had
occurred.207
To the contrary, the Kosilek II majority believed the lower
court’s dismissal of Dr. Schmidt’s testimony was “based on several

197. Compare Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 63 (refusing to dismiss Dr. Schmidt’s
testimony), with Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2014) (dismissing
Dr. Schmidt’s testimony as imprudent), withdrawn, Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 122194, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at *3 (1st Cir. Feb. 12, 2014).
198. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 191.
199. Kosilek, 740 F.3d at 748, withdrawn.
200. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 235 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d en
banc, Kosilek, 774 F.3d 63.
201. Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 235–36, rev’d en banc, Kosilek, 774 F.3d 63.
202. Kosilek, 740 F.3d at 763, withdrawn.
203. Id. at 761-764.
204. Id. at 763.
205. Id. at 764.
206. Id. at 764-66.
207. Id. at 763, 766.
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erroneous determinations.”208 First, the majority took issue with the
amount of deference the lower court gave to the Standards of Care,
pointing out that the document itself admits that “significant
flexibility in their interpretation and application” is proper.209
Additionally, the lower court’s own court-appointed expert testified
that the Standards of Care was a “consensus document” forged
together through a political process, and that Dr. Schmidt’s views,
“however unpopular and uncompassionate in the eyes of some
experts . . . is within prudent professional community standards.”210
The appointed expert further explained that “[t]reatment stopping
short of SRS would be considered adequate by many psychiatrists .
. . [and] patients themselves.”211
The Kosilek II majority believed that the central question was
whether the decision not to provide SRS was “sufficiently harmful .
. . so as to violate the Eighth Amendment.”212 The court expressed
concern over the potential risk of increased suicidality following
denial of SRS, and it agreed with Kosilek that a “clear risk of future
harm may suffice to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.”213
However, it found that the DOC’s treatment plan accounted for
Kosilek’s needs and utilized “methods proven to alleviate Kosilek's
mental distress while crafting a plan to minimize the risk of future
harm.”214 Kosilek herself admitted that the current level of
treatment had led to a “significant stabilization in her mental
state,” and her doctors confirmed that admission. 215 Accordingly,
the majority believed the lower court had “unduly minimize[d] the
nature of the DOC's preferred treatment plan,”216 finding that “the
DOC has chosen one of two alternatives—both of which are
reasonably commensurate with the medical standards of prudent
professionals, and both of which provide Kosilek with a significant
measure of relief.”217 Thus, the DOC’s refusal to provide SRS did not
violate the Eighth Amendment.218
2. The Subjective Prong
Although the Kosilek II majority determined that Kosilek’s
constitutional claim failed because she did not satisfy the objective
prong, the court still analyzed the relevant facts under the

208. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2014).
209. Id. at 87.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 89.
213. Id. at 90.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 89.
217. Id. at 90.
218. Id.
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subjective prong.219 It held that this standard presented another
burden that Kosilek could not meet.220 Even if Kosilek could have
shown that SRS was the only adequate treatment option, she would
have also needed to show that “the DOC was—and continue[d] to
be—deliberately indifferent to her serious risk of harm.” 221
Effectively, this would require Kosilek to establish that the prison
officials knew (or should have known) that SRS was the only
adequate treatment for her condition, and still failed to provide the
procedure.222 This was not the case. Because the DOC sought
opinions from multiple medical experts, and received alternative
treatment plans, “each developed . . . to mitigate the severity of
Kosilek's mental distress,” its choice to not provide SRS did not rise
to the level of deliberate indifference.223 Ultimately, the majority
recognized that although the DOC’s treatment plan was “disfavored
by some in the field,” it was still developed by competent medical
professionals, and therefore, the denial of Kosilek’s request did not
“exhibit a level of inattention or callousness . . . rising to a
constitutional violation.”224
The majority also criticized the lower court for ignoring the
DOC’s stated security concerns.225 It explained that it “takes no
great stretch of the imagination” to recognize that housing a postoperative male-to-female transsexual in a male facility could create
security concerns.226 Likewise, housing Kosilek, a biologically born
male who had been convicted of murdering his wife, in a women’s
facility
could
also
present
significant
concerns—
especially due to the fact that women’s prison facilities often contain
a high number of domestic violence survivors.227
Ultimately, the DOC’s security concerns were found to be
reasonable.228 According to the majority, the lower court failed to
give proper deference to the prison officials’ judgment and
improperly relied upon its own beliefs. 229 The prison officials had
decades of combined experience in the management of penological
institutions and were therefore much better suited to make security
determinations than the court.230 As such, the majority provided a

219. Id. at 91.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 91-92.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 92-96.
226. Id. at 93.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 93-96.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 94.
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wide level of deference to the prison officials’ judgment, and
reversed the decision of the lower court.231 232

PART IV: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Legal battles involving medical care for transgender inmates
have been occurring for decades.233 Often, these cases involved a
fight to have gender dysphoria recognized as a serious medical
condition, and efforts to receive treatment, such as hormone
therapy.234 Progress has at times been slow, but today, many of
these battles have been won in courts throughout the country. 235
While efforts to receive SRS have generally been futile, 236 recent
events suggest a shift in American law, policy, and opinion that
could benefit transsexual inmates seeking SRS.
First, in May of 2014, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services [HHS] announced that its prior policy, which
banned the use of Medicare funding for SRS, was based upon
outdated science, and was therefore invalidated. 237 This makes it
231. Id. at 93-96.
232. The ultimate result of the Kosilek saga aligns with the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to second-guess a doctor’s decision regarding “matter[s] for medical
judgment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). However, medical
testimony may at times warrant second-guessing. While there is no set formula
for determining exactly when a medical expert’s testimony is outside the bounds
of professional prudence, drawing from the standard the Supreme Court has
established to govern the admissibility of expert testimony may be beneficial.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Court explained that judges
play a “gatekeeping role,” ensuring that scientific evidence meets a certain
standard of reliability before it is admitted at trial. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
The stated goal of this standard is to “ensure that any and all scientific
testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable.” Id. at 589. In doing so, a court
should not only analyze “what the experts say, but what basis they have for
saying it.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
This standard may serve as a useful analytical framework in this setting as
well, because ultimately, if an expert’s testimony would be considered
admissible under a Daubert analysis, then it follows that there is some
reasonable basis for the expert’s position.
233. For a more comprehensive discussion of the history of transgender
inmates seeking expanded rights to medical care, see Drechsler, supra note 149;
see also Kayleigh Smith, Free to Be Me: Incorporating Transgender Voices into
the Development of Prison Policies, 15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 253, 263-73
(2015); Travis Wright Colopy, Note: Setting Gender Identity Free: Expanding
Treatment for Transsexual Inmates, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 227, 252-58 (2012);
Dan Schneider, Decency, Evolved: The Eighth Amendment Right to Transition
in Prison, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 835, 845–48 (2016).
234. See generally Drechsler, supra note 149; Smith, supra note 233, at 26373; Colopy, supra note 233, at 252-58; Schneider, supra note 233, at 845-48.
235. See Smith, supra note 233, at 263-73; see Susan S. Bendlin, Gender
Dysphoria in the Jailhouse: A Constitutional Right to Hormone Therapy, 61
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 957, 962-68 (2013).
236. See generally Drechsler, supra note 149.
237. National Center for Transgender Equality, Know Your Rights:
Medicare, NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, www.transequalit

2017]

Polarizing Problems

773

possible for transsexual individuals receiving Medicare services to
have the costs of SRS covered.238 However, this does not function as
a blanket approval policy.239 Rather, deciding whether to fund SRS
will be made on a case-by-case basis, like all other services covered
under Medicare.240
Similarly, in May of 2016, HHS implemented new provisions
to the Affordable Care Act that, amongst other changes, prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex—which was defined to include
discrimination based upon gender identity. 241 Transgender rights
activists celebrated this provision as a groundbreaking step towards
adequately protecting those affected by gender dysphoria. 242
However, on December 31, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas issued an injunction on religious liberty
grounds prohibiting HHS from enforcing the provision as it relates
to issues of gender identity and abortion. 243 Due to this ongoing
litigation, as well as the uncertain future of the Affordable Care
Act,244 the fate of this provision is unclear. While it does not directly
involve incarcerated individuals, it highlights the continued
political shift towards expanded rights for the transgender
population.
In 2015 a federal district court ordered the California DOC to
provide Michelle Norsworthy, a transsexual inmate, with SRS. 245 As
in Kosilek I and II, the court’s opinion of the Standards of Care
played an important role in its decision. The court noted that the
conclusions of the DOC’s medical expert were “at odds with the
Standards of Care” which “are recognized as authoritative
standards of care by the American Medical Association.”246 Further,
the court believed Norsworthy was likely to succeed on her
y.org/know-your-rights/medicare (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Zack Ford, New Obamacare Regulations Ensure Transgender
People’s Access To Health Care, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 3, 2015), https://think
progress.org/new-obamacare-regulations-ensure-transgender-peoples-accessto-health-care-d3a703a0c2a6#.nypactvrq. For information regarding the
implementation schedule of the provision, as well as its current status, see U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, Section 1557 of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, HHS.GOV, www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/se
ction-1557/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
242. Ford, supra note 241.
243. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, supra note 241; see also
American Civil Liberties Union, Franciscan Alliance v. Burwell, AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, www.aclu.org/cases/franciscan-alliance-v-burwell (last
updated Jan. 9, 2017).
244. See Margot Sanger-Katz, What Does Trump’s Executive Order Against
Obamacare Actually Do?, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Jan. 21, 2017), www.nytim
es.com/2017/01/21/upshot/what-does-the-order-against-the-health-law-actually
-do.html?_r=0 (discussing the uncertain future of the Affordable Care Act).
245. Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
246. Id. at 1190.
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deliberate indifference claim because “[d]espite access to the
relevant Standards of Care and evidence that SRS was medically
necessary for Norsworthy, Defendants failed to provide her with
SRS, or to refer her to a specialist for further evaluation.”247
This case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit; however, one day
prior to the scheduled oral arguments, Norsworthy was paroled and
the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case as moot.248 Regardless, the
decision still made a significant impact. Later that same year the
State of California settled a claim with Shiloh Quine, an inmate
convicted of first-degree murder, who had been incarcerated since
1980.249 California conceded that Quine suffered from severe gender
dysphoria, and that SRS was a medically necessary procedure in
her case.250 In doing so, California became the first state to agree to
pay for a transgender inmate’s SRS. 251 Following her procedure,
Quine will be moved to a women’s prison facility.252 While a
settlement agreement is not precedential, Ilona Turner, the legal
director of the Transgender Law Center in Oakland, which handled
both Norsworthy and Quine’s cases, stated that she believes the
decisions “clearly [mark] where the law is going and where the
entire health industry is going.”253
Finally, in 2016, the Department of Defense overturned its ban
of transgender individuals serving in the military. 254 The new policy
made it clear that service members would be allowed to transition
genders.255 Prior to this change, service members who received
gender transition services were discharged.256 Earlier that year, the
United States Army granted a request for hormone therapy from
Chelsea Manning, a transsexual inmate who had been sentenced to
thirty-five years in prison for leaking classified government files
while serving in the United States Army. 257 Shortly thereafter, SRS
was recommended for Manning, and the Army indicated that it
planned to move forward with that recommendation.258 However, in
January of 2017, former President Barack Obama commuted the
remainder of Manning’s sentence, moving her release date up to
247. Id. at 1189-90.
248. Norsworthy v. Beard, 802 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2015).
249. Paige St. John, In a First, California Agrees to Pay for Transgender
Inmate's Sex Reassignment, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015, 3:30 AM), www.latime
s.com/local/california/la-me-inmate-transgender-20150810-story.html.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Jonah Engel Bromwich, Chelsea Manning Told She Can Have Gender
Reassignment Surgery, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016), www.nytime
s.com/2016/09/14/us/chelsea-manning-told-she-can-have-gender-reassignmentsurgery-lawyer-says.html.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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May 2017.259 After her release, the military was no longer
responsible for Manning’s medical care, and SRS was not
provided.260
The military’s stance on transgender service members was
once again thrust into the forefront of national news on July 26,
2017 when President Donald Trump announced his intention to
reinstate the ban on transgender individuals serving “in any
capacity in the U.S. Military.”261 This announcement was
immediately met with backlash and protests nationwide, and the
fate of the potential policy remains unknown. 262
While these recent trends and events are not binding upon
prison facilities throughout the country, they do signal potential
change on the horizon. Where courts, such as Kosilek II, have
indicated that SRS was not the only medically adequate treatment
available for inmates suffering from severe gender dysphoria, these
recent developments indicate that both medical and social
trends increasingly support the notion that SRS is an effective and
sometimes necessary treatment for transsexual individuals.

PART V: DISCUSSION
Despite the recent shift towards expanded rights and
protections for transsexual individuals, prison officials do not
violate the Eighth Amendment by simply refusing a transsexual
inmate’s request for SRS. Treatment plans that lack the
procedure—but still treat the underlying condition—remain
constitutionally sufficient if the plan is supported by a qualified
medical professional acting in good faith. Arguments to the contrary
misconstrue Eighth Amendment requirements and ignore serious
problems with the available body of research that has assessed the
efficacy of the procedure.
Additionally, prison officials are provided “wide-ranging
deference” in making decisions that affect the security and safety of
inmates under their care.263 The placement and protection of
transsexual inmates presents challenging issues with no easy
answers.264 Providing an inmate with SRS could create further
259. Charlie Savage, Chelsea Manning to Be Released Early as Obama
Commutes Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17
/us/politics/obama-commutes-bulk-of-chelsea-mannings-sentence.html.
260. Id.
261. President Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26,
2017, 6:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/8901961643138334
72?lang=en.
262. Karma Allen, Protests Erupt Nationwide Following Trump's
Transgender Military Ban Announcement, ABC NEWS (July 27, 2017), http://ab
cnews.go.com/US/protesters-rally-trumps-transgender-military-ban/story?id=4
8876355.
263. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
264. See supra Part II (discussing challenges faced by transsexual inmates,
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complications.265 Ultimately, due to the uncertainty that continues
to surround the efficacy of SRS, coupled with the substantial
security considerations that could arise following the procedure,
prison officials do not violate the Eighth Amendment by simply
denying a transsexual inmate’s request for SRS. A closer analysis
under the Supreme Court’s two-pronged test confirms this
conclusion.

A. The Test Applied
The first prong is an objective standard that requires a
“sufficiently serious” deprivation of medical care. 266 The second
prong is a subjective standard that is only met if prison officials act
deliberately indifferent towards a serious risk to an inmate’s health
or safety.267 Both prongs must be satisfied to prevail on an
inadequate medical care claim.268
1. The Objective Prong
The first prong requires “proof of a serious medical need.”269 A
medical condition or need is objectively serious “if it is one that has
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.”270 The Supreme Court has not yet
heard a case in which it specifically identified gender dysphoria as
a serious medical condition.271 However, multiple lower courts
throughout the country have found that it meets the requisite
criteria.272 Admittedly, there remains disagreement within the
medical community over whether transsexualism is anything more
than a mental illness, 273 and the cause of the condition remains
shrouded in uncertainty.274 However, this is unlikely to prevent a
court from viewing transsexualism as a serious medical condition

as well as challenges that such inmates may present for prison officials).
265. See infra Part V(A)(2)(a) (discussing potential security concerns that
could arise following an inmate receiving SRS).
266. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
267. Id. at 834–40 (1994); see also McGrath, supra note 142, at 665.
268. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014).
269. Id.
270. Supra note 142.
271. See Smith, supra note 233, at 263 (discussing relevant cases throughout
the country, and identifying courts without relevant precedent or where the
results have been “foggy.”).
272. Id. at 263-73.
273. McHugh, supra note 16.
274. See Elizabeth R. Boskey, Understanding Transgender Identity
Development in Childhood and Adolescence, 9 AM. J. SEXUALITY EDUC., 445,
451-53 (2014).
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because the Supreme Court has held that unreasonable risk of
future harm can sustain an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim. 275
Such risk is present here. Many transsexual individuals report
that they have attempted suicide, 276 and if gender dysphoria is left
untreated, suicide rates can increase dramatically.277 Surely a
substantially increased risk that an inmate will commit suicide
could be considered an unreasonable risk of future harm—and
indeed, lower courts have found that to be the case. 278 However, this
test is a fact-specific inquiry,279 so presumably, a court may not view
the condition as objectively serious if the inmate does not manifest
severe symptoms, such as suicidal ideation, or if the court finds the
inmate’s claims regarding symptoms to be falsified.
a. The Medical Necessity of SRS
The next question under the first prong is whether SRS is a
necessary treatment for severe gender dysphoria—such that denial
of the procedure violates a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. 280
While inmates are not entitled to receive the most cutting-edge
treatments available, prison officials must provide care that aligns
with evolving standards of decency.281
However, no clear test exists for determining when medical
treatment meets this threshold. While the testimony of medical
experts is certainly an important consideration, these cases
typically involve competing medical opinions.282 As a result, the
court must determine whether one expert’s opinion is clearly right,
or if there is room for reasonable experts to disagree. 283 However,
this is a challenging task because judges are not medical experts
themselves.284 While the court may appoint its own independent
275. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
276. Grant et al., supra note 35, at 82.
277. Sylvia Rivera Law Project, supra note 14, at 28.
278. E.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 90 (1st Cir. 2014).
279. E.g., Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2005); Waldrop
v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 1989).
280. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86 (“That GID is a serious medical need, and
one which mandates treatment, is not in dispute in this case. . . . Rather, the
parties disagree over whether SRS is a medically necessary component of
Kosilek's care, such that any course of treatment not including surgery is
constitutionally inadequate.”).
281. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (internal citations
omitted).
282. E.g., Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 74-79.
283. Cf. Id.; Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App'x 892, 897 (11th Cir. 2007)
("Nothing in our case law would derive a constitutional deprivation from a
prison physician's failure to subordinate his own professional judgment to that
of another doctor . . . ."); Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261
(7th Cir. 1996); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977).
284. See Adam B. Badawi, Influence Costs and the Scope of Board Authority,
39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 675, 706 (2014) (“[T]here are plenty of fields where judges
do not have expertise where they are perfectly comfortable second-guessing

778

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:747

expert, this does not insulate its decision against reversal. 285 The
lower court in Kosilek appointed an independent expert, but still
made the “significantly flawed inferential leap” of relying upon its
“own— non-medical —judgment.”286
Applying an objective analytical framework, such as the
Supreme Court’s Daubert287 standard, may help a court remain
objective, and reach reliable conclusions. 288 The purpose of the
Daubert standard is to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony
. . . is not only relevant, but reliable.”289 While it was designed to
govern the admissibility of expert testimony, it is a logical and
natural fit in this setting as well. Courts are encouraged to examine
“whether the theory or technique employed by the expert is
generally accepted in the scientific community; whether it's been
subjected to peer review and publication; whether it can be and has
been tested; and whether the known or potential rate of error is
acceptable.”290 However, these factors are illustrative rather than
exhaustive.291 Essentially, a court is supposed to objectively analyze
not only “what the experts say, but what basis they have for saying
it.”292
However, this is not a recommendation for independent
judicial investigation. Such activity remains highly controversial. 293
Rather, this is suggested only as an objective analytical framework
to help courts determine if an expert’s medical testimony falls
outside the bounds of professional prudence. If parties to the suit do
not present all information needed for such an analysis, the court
may appoint an independent expert to fill the remaining gaps. 294

decisions. Perhaps the most prominent example is the medical field. Judges are
not medical experts . . .”).
285. See e.g., Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 88 (where a lower court’s decision was
reserved, even though the lower court heard testimony from a court-appointed
expert).
286. Id. at 84-89.
287. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
288. Infra note 232.
289. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
290. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.
1995).
291. Id. at 1316-17.
292. Id. at 1316.
293. For a discussion of opposing views on independent judicial
investigation, as well as an argument for its expanded use, see Edward K.
Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L. J. 1263,
1285-1318 (2007).
294. JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COURTAPPOINTED EXPERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 12 (1993) (“[E]xperts are most often appointed
to assist in understanding technical issues necessary to reach a decision. The
desire for such assistance was attributed by the judges to a lack of knowledge
in an essential area, a concern over the technical nature of an issue or issues,
or a concern over the need to properly articulate the rationale for a decision.”).
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b. The Research Examined
It is improper to reject an expert’s medical testimony simply
because the expert does not view SRS as a medically necessary
treatment for severe gender dysphoria. Drawing from Daubert and
engaging in an objective, independent validation of the conflicting
claims regarding SRS reveals considerable room for reasonable
experts to disagree.
One suggested consideration under Daubert is general
acceptance within the relevant professional community. 295 In
Norsworthy, the court rejected the testimony of the DOC’s medical
expert, finding it to be “at odds with the Standards of Care” which
“are recognized as authoritative standards . . . by the American
Medical Association.”296 However, pointing to acceptance by
organizations such as the American Medical Association [AMA] as
definitive proof of general acceptance in the medical community is
misleading. For example, while the AMA is often touted as “the
voice of doctors,”297 in reality, less than twenty percent of physicians
in the United States are members of the organization.298 Further, a
survey of physicians conducted in 2011 revealed that seventy-seven
percent of respondents did not believe the AMA accurately reflected
their medical views.299
Additionally, general acceptance in the medical community is
not outcome determinative. Rather, it is merely one suggested
consideration under Daubert.300 Courts should not only analyze
“what the experts say, but what basis they have for saying it.” 301 As
such, even if a majority of testifying experts claim SRS is medically
necessary, the court should still examine the basis of this claim to
make sure it is reasonably supported by empirical evidence.302
In both Kosilek and Norsworthy, medical experts testified that
SRS was an effective and necessary treatment for an inmate with
severe gender dysphoria.303 Much of this testimony relied upon the
295. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
296. Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1170, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
297. Linda Girgis, Is the AMA Really the Voice of Physicians in the US?,
PHYSICIAN’S WEEKLY (June 9, 2015), www.physiciansweekly.com/is-the-ama-re
ally-the-voice-of-physicians-in-the-us/.
298. Id.
299. Igor Volsky, 77 Percent Of Doctors Say AMA Does Not Represent Their
Views, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 7, 2011), https://thinkprogress.org/77-percent-ofdoctors-say-ama-does-not-represent-their-views-7661936dc34.
300. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89, 594 (“Nothing . . . establishes ‘general
acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.”).
301. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.
1995).
302. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 (“The inquiry envisioned . . . [is] a
flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission.”).
303. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 74-77 (1st Cir. 2014); Norsworthy v.
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WPATH Standards of Care.304 However, in both cases the DOC
presented testimony from experts who believed SRS was not
medically necessary.305 In Kosilek, the lower court rejected the
testimony of the DOC’s medical expert, finding his conclusions to be
unreasonable because “he [did] not accept certain fundamental
features of the Standards of Care.” 306 Likewise, in Norsworthy, the
court dismissed the testimony of the DOC’s expert because it was
“at odds with the Standards of Care.”307
Such findings are improper and ignore serious problems with
the available body of research that has assessed the efficacy of SRS.
If the beneficial effects of SRS are truly “undeniable”—as WPATH
claims them to be308— then perhaps a court is justified in dismissing
a medical expert as professionally imprudent if his or her proposed
treatment plan does not include the procedure. 309 However,
available outcome studies critically examining SRS leave
considerable room for doubt and disagreement on this point. While
some studies show optimistic results, 310 others present conflicting
and worrisome outcomes, including reports of “regrets, psychiatric
morbidity, and suicide attempts following the procedure.”311
Even favorable research regarding the efficacy of SRS is
concerning. The most comprehensive, modern study cited by
WPATH in support of its claim that SRS has “undeniable beneficial
effects”312 includes a startling summary of shortcomings that plague
available research.313 This study narrowed its analysis to include
only the best, most reliable research conducted after 1990. 314
Alarmingly, even when narrowed to this select group the data
remained questionable because none of the studies was able to
utilize a control group to compare against an experimental group. 315
Additionally, “sound psychometric instruments were not used;”
results were “seriously skewed” because many initial participants
were lost at follow-up; and for many of the studies the main outcome
variable was not whether SRS effectively reduced gender dysphoria,
which means the central question—whether SRS effectively treats

Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1170, 1185-90 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
304. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 74-77; Norsworthy, 87 F.Supp. 3d at 1185-90.
305. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 74-77; Norsworthy, 87 F.Supp. 3d at 1185-90.
306. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 235 (D. Mass. 2012) rev’d en
banc, Kosilek, 774 F.3d 63.
307. Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. at 1170, 1190.
308. WPATH, supra note 41, at 55.
309. See Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. at 235-36 (disregarding expert medical
testimony because it conflicted with WPATH’s Standards of Care), rev’d en
banc, Kosilek, 774 F.3d 63.
310. Gijs & Brewaeys, supra note 58, at 199.
311. See Dhejne et al., supra note 17, at e16885-1 to e16885-2.
312. WPATH, supra note 41, at 55.
313. Gijs & Brewaeys, supra note 58, at 199.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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the condition— was left unanswered.316 Ultimately, the study
reported that 96% of transsexuals who received SRS reported
feeling satisfied with the outcome of the procedure. 317 However, the
poor data used to reach this conclusion leaves ample room for
skepticism, and the study’s own authors acknowledged that their
findings should be “carefully qualified.”318
Admittedly, this research was published in 2007. 319 With a
decade having passed, one could hope that more reliable studies
have been produced since; and surely a court should look to the best
research available when examining the basis of an expert’s claims.
However, more recent studies continue to be plagued by similar
methodological shortcomings.320 Until more reliable data is
produced, it remains reasonable for medical professionals to view
the Standards of Care as flexible guidelines, and prudent for courts
to provide medical experts with a significant level of deference. As
a result, simply denying an inmate’s request for SRS cannot
definitively be considered a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of
medical care, and fails to satisfy the first prong of the Supreme
Court’s test.
2. The Subjective Prong
The subjective prong requires an inmate to show that prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference towards a serious risk to
the inmate’s health or safety.321 However, because both prongs must
be satisfied to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, 322 the
subjective prong only becomes relevant if a court determines that
denial of SRS constitutes an objectively serious deprivation of care,
thereby satisfying the first prong.
Consider Estelle, where doctors diagnosed the inmate with a
lower back strain, and proscribed pain relievers, muscle relaxants
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 178.
320. See e.g., Jochen Hess et al., Satisfaction With Male-to-Female Gender
Reassignment Surgery, 111 DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INT’L 795, 800 (2014)
(“response rate of less than 50% must be mentioned as a shortcoming of this
study. This may have led to a bias in the results.”); Dhejne et al., supra note 17,
at e16885-2 (explaining the limitations that “preclude solid and generalizable
conclusions” regarding the efficacy of SRS, including: the impossibility of
performing double blind, randomized controlled studies of SRS; constrained
follow-up studies due to a limited number of subjects; high rates of participant
drop-out and consequent selection bias; and limited follow-up periods); Murad
et al., supra note 85, at 214-31 (identifying “serious methodological limitations”
as the reason why the current body of research supporting SRS “is of very low
quality.”).
321. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-40 (1994); see also McGrath,
supra note 142, at 665.
322. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014).
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and bed rest.323 Although other treatments could have been
pursued, the Court viewed this as “a classic example of a matter for
medical judgment,” and did not view a “medical decision not to order
an X-ray, or like measures” to constitute deliberate indifference.324
Similarly, if under the objective prong the court determines that
reasonable medical experts may disagree over the necessity of SRS,
then a decision to not provide the procedure will likely be viewed
the same way: as a matter for medical judgment that does not rise
to the level of deliberate indifference.
If a court does determine that denial of SRS is an objectively
serious deprivation of care, then denying a transsexual inmate’s
request for the procedure comes under much greater scrutiny. 325
Prison officials must either be unaware that denial of the procedure
constitutes a serious deprivation of care, or be able to show that
sufficient security considerations justify denial of the procedure. 326
However, a lack of knowledge is unlikely to prevent an injunction
from being granted, because deliberate indifference “should be
determined in light of the prison authorities' . . . attitudes and
conduct at the time suit is brought and [their attitudes and conduct]
persisting thereafter.”327 As such, once a court determines denial of
SRS constitutes an objectively serious deprivation of care, prison
officials involved in the suit can no longer claim ignorance regarding
the necessity of the procedure. In this situation, only substantial
security considerations can justify a continued refusal to provide
SRS.
a. Security Concerns
An objectively serious deprivation of care may be justified if
prison officials can show that providing the procedure is likely to
create unreasonable risks for the transsexual inmate or for other
inmates housed in the same facility. 328 The Supreme Court has
explained that “maintaining institutional security and preserving
internal order and discipline . . . may require limitation or retraction
of the retained constitutional rights of . . . convicted prisoners.”329
Accordingly, “even when an institutional restriction infringes a
specific constitutional guarantee . . . the practice must be evaluated
in the light of the central objective of prison administration” which
is to protect and promote security within the prison facility.330
323. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
324. Id.
325. See Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1189-90 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
326. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45; Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 454-55
(1st Cir. 2011).
327. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added).
328. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979); see also Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 844-45; Battista, 645 F.3d 449, 454-55 (1st Cir. 2011).
329. Bell, 441 U.S. at 546-47.
330. Id.

2017]

Polarizing Problems

783

Prison officials are provided “wide-ranging deference” in such
matters.331
Providing an inmate with SRS may significantly increase
health and safety risks for both the transsexual inmate and other
inmates within their facility. For example, if a biologically born
male prisoner is provided SRS, thereby receiving female genitalia,
prison officials must make a difficult decision regarding where to
house the inmate, without exposing that inmate or any other inmate
to unacceptable levels of risk or psychological trauma. 332 If left in a
male facility, the potential for sexual assault requires “no great
stretch of the imagination.”333 Transsexual inmates already face
intense discrimination and victimization in prison, and providing
the procedure may only increase these unfortunate events. 334
Transferring the inmate to a female facility also creates potential
health and safety concerns. Many female inmates have been
victimized by men during their lives,335 and placing a biologically
born male in a female facility could cause them significant mental
and emotional distress.336
Reversing this hypothetical scenario presents similar
problems. If a biologically born female receives male sex organs and
is transferred to a male facility, the risk of harassment and sexual
assault once again seems clear.337 If left in a female facility, sexual
assault remains a concern. Inmate-on-inmate sexual violence is “at
least three times higher” in women’s prison facilities than in men’s
facilities.338 This may be due to female prison infrastructure lagging
behind the substantial increase in female incarceration rates. 339 As

331. Id. at 547.
332. Cf. Battista, 645 F.3d at 454 (“[T]his would be a much harder case if
defendants had proffered a persuasive and untainted professional judgment
that--while hormone therapy would help Battista--the dangers, security costs
and other impediments made it infeasible.”).
333. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 93 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Farmer, 511
U.S. at 848–49); Cf. Will Worley, Transgender woman 'raped 2,000 times' in allmale prison, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 18, 2016), www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/australasia/transgender-woman-raped-2000-times-male-prison-a698936
6.html.
334. Cf. Worley, supra note 333.
335. DOJ: OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, PRIOR ABUSE REPORTED BY
INMATES AND PROBATIONERS (1999), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/parip.pdf.
336. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 80 (“Kosilek's presence could create significant
disruption in [the women’s facility], given that Kosilek had been convicted for
violently murdering her wife, and that a significant portion of women at [the
facility] were victims of domestic abuse.”).
337. Cf. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 93; Worley, supra note 333.
338. DOJ: OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, PREA DATA COLLECTION
ACTIVITIES (2012), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdca12.pdf.
339. See ACLU, Facts About the Over-Incarceration of Women in the United
States, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, www.aclu.org/other/facts-about-over
-incarceration-women-united-states (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
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a result, female prison facilities are often “overcrowded and poorly
designed, making them difficult to police.” 340
One potential solution may be to avoid these risks altogether
by placing transsexual inmates in protective custody or solitary
confinement indefinitely. However, the viability of this strategy
seems doubtful.341 Solitary confinement has seen extensive use, and
the results are typically less than ideal.342 It has been shown to
cause mental and emotional trauma, and the U.N. has indicated
that stays in solitary confinement longer than fifteen days may be
considered torture.343
Perhaps a more reasonable approach would be the creation of
separate facilities specifically for transgender inmates. In fact,
Rikers Island jail facility, the second largest jail in the nation,
recently opened a separate unit for transgender women. 344 Yet even
this presents unique risks.345 A similar facility for gay and
transgender inmates at Rikers was shut down in 2005 after
violence-prone inmates started pretending to be gay or transgender
in order to gain access to the facility, seeking to “prey on” and “take
advantage of a group they perceived as weak.” 346
While some of these risks remain somewhat speculative, prison
officials must only articulate a reasonable explanation as to why
security considerations render the provision of SRS infeasible. 347
Additionally, courts are to provide considerable deference to prison
officials in matters regarding institutional security. 348 The security
concerns that may arise if a transsexual inmate is provided SRS are
substantial, and present no easy solutions. Prison officials who
choose to mitigate risk by providing an alternative treatment plan
likely have a reasonable basis for doing so, and therefore, do not
violate of the Eighth Amendment.
340. Christina Piecora, Female Inmates and Sexual Assault, JURIST (Sept.
14, 2014), www.jurist.org/dateline/2014/09/christina-piecora-female-inmates.p
hp.
341. See Editorial Board, Solitary Confinement Is Cruel and All Too
Common, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Sept. 2, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2
015/09/03/opinion/solitary-confinement-is-cruel-common-and-useless.html
(discussing the inhumane nature of indefinite solitary confinement, and the
shift away from such punishment in the United States).
342. Aviva Stahl, The Shocking, Painful Trauma of Being a Trans Prisoner
in Solitary Confinement, VICE: BROADLY (Jan. 22, 2016), broadly.vice.com/
en_us/article/the-shocking-painful-trauma-of-being-a-trans-prisoner-in-solita
ry-confinement.
343. Editorial Board, supra note 341.
344. Christopher Mathias, New York’s Largest Jail to Open Housing Unit
For Transgender Women, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2014), www.huffingtonp
ost.com/2014/11/18/rikers-transgender-women_n_6181552.html.
345. Paul Von Zielbauer, New York Set to Close Jail Unit for Gays, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2005), www.nytimes.com/2005/12/30/nyregion/new-york-set-toclose-jail-unit-for-gays.html.
346. Id.
347. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844-45 (1994).
348. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
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PART VI: CONCLUSION
Inmates are not traditionally seen as a group that garners, or
perhaps even deserves much sympathy.349 Yet, treating prisoners
with respect is rooted deeply in the American tradition, 350 and the
Court has declared that “it is but just that the public be required to
care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his
liberty, care for himself.”351 In severe cases, failure to provide
adequate treatment can lead to torture or even death, “the evils of
most immediate concern to the drafters of the [Eighth]
Amendment.”352 In the world of transsexual inmates, these concerns
can be all too real.353
However, inmates do not have a constitutional right to
unqualified access to medical care. 354 Rather, the law simply
dictates that they receive care that is adequate and compatible with
the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”355 This legal standard, in light of the current
understanding of SRS, does not create a constitutional right for
transsexual inmates to receive SRS. For such a right to exist, the
efficacy and necessity of the procedure must be so well established
that no medical expert could reasonably believe it was not a
necessary treatment for severe gender dysphoria. 356 Currently,
considerable room for disagreement exists on this point. 357 SRS is a
unique procedure that has proven difficult to study, 358 and the
understanding of its overall effectiveness and long-term
ramifications is limited.359 While some studies indicate optimistic

349. Kevin H. Wozniak, American Public Opinion About Prisons, 39 CRIM.
JUST. REV. 305, 305 (2014).
350. Julie Gutman Dickinson, What Would George Do?, HUFFINGTON POST,
www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-b-gutman/founding-fathers-stance-on-torture_b
_1644769.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
351. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Spicer v.
Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490 (1926).
352. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
353. See Sylvia Rivera Law Project, supra note 14, at 1, 17, 19, 25, 30
(recounting horrors faced by transsexual inmates); see also Worley, supra note
333 (same).
354. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
355. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03 (internal citations omitted).
356. See id. at 107; see also Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App'x 892, 897 (11th
Cir. 2007) ("Nothing in our case law would derive a constitutional deprivation
from a prison physician's failure to subordinate his own professional judgment
to that of another doctor . . . ."); Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254,
261 (7th Cir. 1996); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977).
357. See infra Part IV.
358. Dhejne et al., supra note 17, at e16885-1 to e16885-2.
359. See id.; Murad et al., supra note 85, at 214-31.
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results, methodological uncertainties cast doubt over such
findings.360
Yet, this may eventually change. As research methods improve
and the stigma surrounding transsexualism continues to decrease,
more individuals are likely to undergo SRS.361 As a result, more
patients may be available to participate in follow-up studies.
Further, individual states are free to voluntarily provide
transsexual inmates with SRS and contribute to a body of research
in need of growth and improvement.362 For states that choose to
provide an alternative treatment plan, they remain within the
bounds of constitutionally adequate medical care as long as
qualified medical professionals support the treatment plans they
implement.
Ultimately, Kosilek II may one day rest on the wrong side of
history.363 However, as the law currently stands, the outcome of the
case remains legally sound and transsexual inmates do not have a
constitutional right to receive SRS. While this may seem cruel to
some,364 it is the correct result when the Supreme Court’s twopronged test is objectively applied. At times, such objectivity may
require a court to make difficult decisions that conflict with societal
trends or even the judge’s personal views. However, this principle
is particularly important when difficult cases presenting important
constitutional issues arise, for “[a] principle applied only when
unimportant is not much of a principle at all.” 365

360. Dhejne et al., supra note 17, at e16885-1 to e16885-2; see also Gijs &
Brewaeys, supra note 58, at 199.
361. Kate Lyons, Gender identity clinic services under strain as referral rates
soar, THE GUARDIAN (July 10, 2016), www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jul/10
/transgender-clinic-waiting-times-patient-numbers-soar-gender-identity-servic
es (“Trans activists suggest this is the tip of the iceberg and that there could be
tens of thousands more considering medical intervention – hormones or surgery
. . . .”).
362. See St. John, supra note 249 (discussing California’s decision to provide
an inmate with SRS).
363. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 113 (1st Cir. 2014) (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).
364. See Mark Pratt, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Transgender Inmate’s
Appeal for Sex Change Surgery, LGBTQ NATION (May 4, 2015), www.lgbtqnat
ion.com/2015/05/u-s-supreme-court-rejects-inmates-appeal-for-sex-change-surg
ery/2/ (“The treatment of [Kosilek] has been cruel and unusual.”).
365. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 806 (2008) (Roberts C.J., joined by
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito JJ., dissenting).

